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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

ERNEST L. STALEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

No. 8190

W. C. GRANT,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
To more accurately state the facts, as recited by the
appellant in its brief, and to supplement the same, the respondent is compelled to make some repetition in the following
statement.
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On the evening of August 22, 1952, the plaintiff and
respondent p.erein, Ernest L. Staley, left his place of employment in Salt Lake City, Utah, intending to proceed to his home
in Murray, Utah. Staley was driving his 1949 Chevrolet Sedan
and was traveling alone (Tr. 13 and 14). He proceeded south
on State Street and stopped his automobile behind another
vehicle, a Mercury, which was stopped on the North side of
the intersection of 9th South Street and State Street waiting
for the semaphore light to change from red to green (Tr.
14, 20, 29, 30, 43 and 44). This Mercury, as well as plaintiff's
automobile, was stopped in the left, inside lane, for southbound traffic. State Street, at this point, was 60 feet in width
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). Each street was divided by double
traffic lines and each had two driving lanes provided for each
direction of traffic, as well as a parking lane on each side
of the respective streets (Tr. 4 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 1).
On this particular evening, the streets were dry, the weather
was clear, and visibility was good (Tr. 11). The intersection was
well lighted and the semaphore traffic light at the intersection
was apparently functioning in a normal manner (Tr. 11 and
12).
When the traffic light changed to green for south-bound
traffic, the Mercury ahead of Staley proceeded forward and
crossed the intersection, traveling south on State Street (Tr.
15, 37, and 44) . Staley also proceeded forward on the green
light and had traveled approximately two-thirds of the distance across 9th South Street when his automobile was struck
on the left side by a 1951 Hudson Sedan owned and then
being driven by W. C. Grant, the defendant and appellant
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herein (Tr. 7, 8, 12, 16, 34, and 45). At the time of impact,
Staley's vehicle was traveling in low gear and the impact was
against the center of the left rear door on his automobile
(Tr. 15 and 17). The force of the impact moved the rear
of Staley's automobile some 10 feet to the south and west,
as evidenced by the skid marks left on the surface of the
roadway (Tr. 7, 8, 12, 16, and 25, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1).
There is a sharp conflict in the evidence concerning the
manner in which this accident occurred. It is the contention
of Staley, the respondent herein, that the intersection was
clear of traffic when the light changed to green and he proceeded to follow the Mercury into and across the intersection.
His position is supported by the testimony of the independent
witnesses, Richard M. Hunsaker and Leon Lowell Davis, as
well as by the physical evidence of the skid marks indicating
the force with which his vehicle was struck. On the other
hand, Grant, the defendant and appellant herein, contends
that he was in the intersection and that Staley drove into
the right front fender of his automobile (Tr. 50, 51, 53, and
54) . The trial court resolved this conflict by adopting Staley's
theory of the case and entered Findings of Fact and Judgment
in accordance therewith, awarding the plaintiff the sum of
$142.01, and costs.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN

AWARDING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF WAS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW AND EVIDENCE.
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2. THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUlLTY OF CON-

TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN AWARDING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW AND EVIDENCE.

POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUlLTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Inasmuch as the foregoing two points are inter-related,
we shall consider them together in the argument hereinafter
set forth.
In order for the appellant to overcome the judgment
entered herein against him, he must demonstrate to this Court
that the evidence shows with such certainty that reasonable
minds could not differ thereon that the plaintiff was guilty
of negligence which proximately contributed to the collision.
It is apparent from the appellant's brief that the only reasonable deduction to be drawn from the evidence is that plaintiff
was negligent, as a matter of law, in failing to observe the
defendant's automobile until it was 4 or 5 feet away from
him. This we cannot agree with. As we previously stated in
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our brief, there is a sharp conflict in the evidence between
plaintiff and defendant as to how the collision occurred. The
plaintiff's version is supported by independent witnesses, as
well as by the physical evidence of the force of the impact
against the plaintiff's vehicle and the distance it was moved
as evidenced by the 10 feet of skid marks made by the rear
wheels in the direction it was pushed by defendant's vehicle.
The defendant claims he was out in the intersection, stopped,
and waiting for east-bound traffic to clear, before he attempted
to turn south on State Street. He did not see the plaintiff's
vehicle before the collision even though one-half of its length
had to have passed in front of him prior to the impact. The
defendant claims he was traveling right behind a taxi which
had preceded his vehicle into the intersection and turned
south on State Street. The plaintiff nor any of the other
witnesses recall seeing any such taxi and testified that the
intersection was clear except for the Mercury which preceded
the plaintiff into the intersection on the green light for southbound traffic. The truth of the matter is, and the trial court
so found, that the defendant apparently become confused
at this intersection and drove his vehicle into it when the
semaphore light was red for his direction of travel. This was
the only reasonable deduction to be made in the light of all
the testimony. As the record will show, this case has been
tried twice, once in the City Court of Salt Lake City, Utah,
and again de novo in the Third Judicial District Court. The
plaintiff having both times prevailed, and the trial court below
having entered judgment in his favor, on conflicting matters
the evidence must now be viewed in the light most favorable
to him. Gibbs vs. Blue Cab (Utah), 249 P. 2d 213, affirmed
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at 259 P. 2d 294; North vs. Cartwright (Utah), 229 P. 2d
871; Staton vs. Western Macaroni Manufacturing Company,
52 Utah 426, 174 P. 821.
The appellant's brief gives great emphasis to the fact
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law
in failing to observe defendant's vehicle until just before
impact or until it was 4 or 5 feet away. The cases cited by
the appellant merely reiterate the well-established rule that
a driver of a motor vehicle must at all times keep a reasonable
lookout for others using the roadway upon which he is
traveling. However, we fail to see wherein. these cases are
applicable to the facts herein under consideration as they do
not involve a collision occurring at an intersection controlled
by a semaphore light. It must be remembered that the instant
case was not tried before a jury and. so the learned trial judge
was the trier both of the facts and the law and his judgment
upon all questions of fact, if supported by any competent evidence, will not be disturbed upon appeal. W eenig Brothers,
Inc., vs. M. Nephi Manning, Utah 1953, 262 P. 2d 491. The
physical facts of the skid marks and the point of impact
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) , positive!y established that plaintiff's
automobile was about two-thirds through the intersection
when forcefully struck by the front end of defendant's vehicle. The impact on the street was 2 feet south and 1 foot
west of the center of the intersection so it is perfectly reasonable for the plaintiff to have followed the Mercury, which
was stopped in front of him, into the intersection without
seeing the defendant's vehicle until just before impact. The
trial court made a finding (R. 79) that the plaintiff proS
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ceeded into the intersection with the green light in his favor
and. that at that time, the intersection was clear of any other
traffic except for the Mercury ahead of him. The court further found that as the front of the plaintiff's automobile
reached about the center of 9th South Street, the defendant
drove his said vehicle into the intersection from the east and
collided with the left side of plaintiff's automobile (R. 79).
With these findings supported by material and competent
testimony, it can well be assumed that the trial court concluded that the plaintiff found himself in a position of peril
by the abrupt actions of the defendant and that he could do
nothing to avoid the collision. Under the findings of the trial
court, the plaintiff had the right of way and was entitled to
rely upon such until he was put on notice by the actions of
the disfavored driver (the defendant herein) that the right
of way was not to be accorded to him. Under the trial court's
interpretation of the evidence, the defendant's version of the
accident was not accepted, and rightly so in the light of the
plaintiff's testimony and that of the independent witnesses,
particularly Richard M. Hunsaker, who was behind the plaintiff and saw the defendant enter the intersection in violation
of the traffic light (Tr. 30, 31, 32, 33, '34, 38, 39 and 40).
What was the duty of the plaintiff as he prepared to cross
the intersection behind the Mercury? It was a duty to use
reasonable care under all the circumstances. Plaintiff testified
that he looked before starting forward and that the intersection was clear of traffic except for the Mercury ahead of
him (Tr. 15, 16, 23, 27 and 28). The plaintiff was traveling
slow and in low, or first gear. His duty was to look ahead,
in the direction of his travel, and he was not obliged to watch
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for traffic approaching from either the east or west until
such time as he would have been put on notice as a reasonable, prudent person, that someone would violate the law
by traveling through the red semaphore light controlling eastwest bound traffic. The learned trial court having made findings, and entered judgment in accordance therewith, thereby
adopting plaintiff's theory of the case as supported by the
weight of the evidence, we therefore respectfully conclude
that the conflicting matters were resolved in favor of the
plaintiff and should not be disturbed by this honorable Court
on appeal. Such conclusion is supported by ample and substantial evidence in the record and is certainly reasonable in
the light of all the testimony.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that under the law, and the facts
in this case, that the findings and judgment of the trial court
are amply supported by the evidence and should be affirmed.
:Respectfully submitted,

F. ROBERT BAYLE

Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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